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unity of command over military forces, the President chose not to federalize the Guard over the objection of the Governor. The issue of command and control of Guard forces in major disasters resulted in an amendment to the Insurrection Act intended to "clarify" the President's authority. The amendment resulted in a backlash from the states which argued the amendment "changed more than 100 years of well established and carefully balanced state-federal and civil-military relationships." In January 2008 the amendment was repealed, calling into question the validity of previous opinions that the President's original authority extended to natural disasters. This essay will examine the history of the Insurrection Act, will analyze the rationale behind the 2007 amendment and it's subsequent repeal, and address the extent, if any, to which the President's authority has been diminished.
DOD RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS -WHY THE NATIONAL GUARD IS OFF LIMITS
Hurricane Katrina was arguably the worst natural disaster the United States has ever faced. Katrina devastated 90,000 square miles, made 770,000 people homeless, and had a death toll of 1,464 in Louisiana alone. 1 Even before the flood-waters began receding, the blame game began. New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin was "characterized as an irrational and incompetent local official who lost control of his city
[and] his police force." 2 Mayor Nagin, in-turn, blamed Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, accusing her of "talking too much, and working too little" 3 and President Bush came under enormous criticism for allegedly responding too slowly with Federal Assistance.
One of the criticisms of the Bush administration was an apparent delay in deploying federal troops to assist in the emergency response. It has been alleged troop deployment was delayed based on Governor Blanco's refusal to cede control of her National Guard to the federal government and a perception, at the highest levels, that the Posse Comitatus Act limited the response federal troops could make. 4 In the aftermath of the storm, in what some would argue was a knee jerk reaction to these criticisms, one of the exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, the Insurrection Act, was amended to clarify the President's authority to unilaterally federalize National Guard troops and use federal forces in response to "natural disasters, epidemics, serious health emergencies, terrorists attacks, or other conditions when the authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order." 5 The amendment, which at first blush appears to expand the President's authority under the Insurrection Act, was met with universal criticism from State Governor's who argued, "Section 1076 stands to potentially undermine governors' authority over the National Guard, which ultimately could place the safety and well being of citizens in jeopardy." 6 Posse Comitatus is defined as: "The power or force of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc." 8 The Posse Comitatus Act specifically states, "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both." 9 The act, in effect, criminalizes the use of the Army and the Air Force as a posse comitatus to execute or enforce the laws of the United States.
Only if "expressly" authorized by the constitution or act of Congress may the Army or Air
Forces be used in a law enforcement role. As will be discussed below, perhaps the most significant of those exceptions is the Insurrection Act.
Origins of The Posse Comitatus Act
Though the Posse Comitatus Act can be directly linked to the use of the armed forces during reconstruction following the civil war, its roots can be traced back to the birth of the United States and is a "reaffirmation of long standing American tradition." 10 The fear of military involvement in domestic matters can be traced to our nation's initial break from the imperial power of England. The proper role of the National Guard in responding to natural disasters, and control of the Guard during such events, is at the hart of the controversy over the amendments made to the Insurrection Act. Before going further, a discussion of the role of the National Guard in responding to Natural Disasters is required.
The National Guard
The National Guard traces its origins to the colonial militias which were used to provide for the common defense of the community and consisted of every able bodied white man. Under Article I, Section 8, clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, the Federal government was given authority to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and to call the militia in to federal service in order to execute the laws of the United States, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion. 20 With the passage of the Dick Act in 1903 and the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, the modern National Guard was forged and formally made part of the federal reserve of the Army (and later the Air Force). This gave the federal government a more active role in training and organizing the militias and enhanced federal authority over the guard, particularly in the areas of equipping and training. "As a result of this history, the National Guard is neither a purely state nor a purely federal organization.
Rather it is both a state and federal organization." The traditional interpretation of section 502(f) is that only duty related to training can be performed. 25 Immediately following 9/11 President Bush announced National
Guardsmen would be used to supplement security in our Nations' Airports. Despite an opinion by the DoD General Counsel that Tilte 32 funds were restricted to training missions, the President authorized the use of 32 U.S.C.502(f) to place guardsmen in the airports, under the command and control of the Governors, but paid for with federal funds.
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The advantage of using the "Title 32" status is that National Guard personnel called to active duty under this authority receive all the pay and allowances of the federal military pay system and receive all the immunities and protections of federal law, including the FTCA, SCRA and USERRA. Another advantage, especially from the state perspective, is that the forces remain under the command and control of the Governor, and, accordingly, are not subject to the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act.
In the case of hurricane Katrina, both SAD and Title 32 Status were used for National Guard personnel responding to the effected areas of Louisiana and
Mississippi. Initially, all personnel were summoned to duty in an SAD status. Shortly after the initial deployment of personnel, however, the National Guard Bureau asked the Secretary of Defense to approve the retroactive transfer of all participating National
Guard personnel from SAD to duty under Title 32. "The purpose of this request was to equalize pay and benefits for all national Guard personnel rather than having their compensation based on disparate state and territorial laws." 27 On September 7, 2005, the request was approved. 
Historical Uses of the insurrection Act
The first, and perhaps most well known, use of the Militia Act was President
Washington's response to the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. Notably, in his proclamation to disperse, in addition to citing the provisions of the Militia Act as his authority for calling forth the militia, Washington also cites his authority under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" as a legal basis for his actions against individuals rebelling against a federal excise tax on spirits. 38 Though the President clearly had independent Constitutional authority to enforce the excise tax, the authority to "call forth the militia," however, came from the Militia Act.
Since that first use, the Militia Act was invoked on numerous occasions including the issuance of a "cease and desist proclamation" by President Adams that quelled In analyzing the current Act it is important to note Section 331 requires a request from the State before the president may invoke the Act to call forth the militia to suppress an insurrection. Section 332 does not require such a request from the state, however, the President must find that "unlawful obstructions, combinations or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States make it impractical to enforce the laws of the United States by ordinary course of judicial proceedings."
45 Section 332 appears to be a reflection of the President's constitutional duty to ensure (Emphasis added). As will be discussed in detail below, it was section 333 that was substantially amended by the 2007 NDAA.
In the modern era, Executive Orders issued by the President have rarely specified which section of the Insurrection Act was being invoked in federalizing the Guard. In the Civil Rights cases of the late fifties and sixties, the Guard was federalized under the Insurrection Act over the objection of Governors to enforce the constitutional rights of African Americans under the 14 th Amendment. Perhaps the most well know case is "the stand in the school house door" in which Governor George Wallace ceremoniously blocked the entrance of two African American students from entering the University of Alabama's Foster Auditorium. Wallace, the governor of Alabama, yielded to one of his own National Guard commanders, who stated, "Governor Wallace, it is my sad duty to inform you that the National Guard has been federalized. Please stand aside so that the order of the court can be accomplished." 47 This action was clearly authorized under Section 332 and 333 of the Insurrection Act as the State refused to enforce and protect the constitutional rights of the students involved.
Notably, since WWII, the Insurrection Act has been used only ten times to
Federalize the Guard, and in the case of responding to natural disasters, always at the request of the state or territorial Governor, and never over the objection of the Governor of the State. 48 Only in those cases where the state failed or refused to enforce or protect the constitutional rights of its citizens, such as in the case of Governor Wallace, [federal] combat troops were to be sent in before order was restored." 50 Governor
Blanco refused "to permit DoD's JTF Katrina to assume control of the evacuation efforts and to assume command of the National Guard personnel in Louisiana." The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it- Perhaps the most compelling evidence that Congress did not intend the Insurrection Act to apply to natural disasters absent a request from the state is the tremendous backlash that occurred when the Amendment was "slipped into the defense bill with little study" and no debate. Congress has spoken. In responding to natural disasters, the consent of the state should be obtained prior to federalizing the guard.
